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Jungian-Mayhem (or a plethora of questions about the functions)

2K views 12 replies 4 participants last post by  The red spirit 
#1 ·
I've begun reading Jung's work on psychological types, and I have quite a few doubts:

- Are extroverted and introverted functions qualitatively different (that is, in addition to the differences that come from the content with which they are concerned)? In writing about introverted thinking, Jung states that the logical underpinnings, the structure of the reasoning itself, is identical in both the introverted and extraverted varients of thinking; this leads me to believe that it is the perennial quality of the subjective, the eternal recurrence of it, the fact that it contains both the "genetic" past of the collective unconscious, and its potential, that provides the introverted functions with what sets them apart from the functions that are concerned with the objective as it manifests currently, locally, as judged by the criteria that can be derived from it once the required assumptions are in place - even for Ne, which would be observing the potential present in the local, something still qualitatively different, probably more divergent...

- Are feeling and thinking not fundamentally concerned with different subject matters, but rather posses incompatible approaches (as in, do ethics and logical mapping belong to both functions)? This seems far more epistemologically consistent, as it would seem to me that both reason and ethics require value-based pressupositions, and they are therefore different in data-sets (locally limited, incomplete and therefore insufficient), but not in essence, ultimately(?)... This would mean that thinking and feeling would merely guide attention (therefore perception, therefore acceptable data, therefore judgement...) differently, handle data differently, concern themselves with different aspects of the implications for the subject (or the world through the subject)...

- What exactly does Jung mean by subjective vs objective? The difference between the two is of course, philosophically murky, but Jung in particular muddies the epistemological distinction in his writings... For instance, is the effect of the object on the subject the focus of the subjective function? Or must it be a more subconscious element still? Is a focus on an "essencial object" subjective in nature (not abstracted from local circumstances)? Jung contrasts Darwin and Kant in his writings, which leads me to wonder (he also clearly states that Te isn't less abstract than Ti, rather, it deals with subject matters that's really either directly abstracted, or recovered from the intersubjective or historical environment)...

- Since Jung speaks of function usage as preferential, not exclusive, is there data that never can be obtained by a set of functions, or is it merely a matter of motion (from the subject outwards, and returning, vs to the object inwards, and out again)?

- I've yet to find it clearly stated that the auxiliary function's orientation counters that of the dominant function (though that is stated about the inferior function), where, if at all is this stated in his work?
 
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#2 · (Edited)
Just so you know, Jung broke with Freud in large part because he thought Freud wanted him (and others) to treat Freud's theories as a kind of religion, rather than having an appropriately sceptical and open-minded scientific attitude toward them. And Isabel Myers did Jung the favor of treating him the same way he treated Freud — putting his original concepts to the test using modern psychometric standards, and being willing to make substantial adjustments to Jung's typology to match her categories to the data.

As further discussed in this post, Jung included what's arguably the lion's share of the modern conception of S/N (the concrete/abstract duality) in his very broad notion of what E/I involved. But Myers discovered that there are abstract extraverts (ENs) and concrete introverts (ISs), and that there's no significant correlation between Myers' (statistically supportable) versions of E/I and S/N. Jung said extraverts tend to subscribe to the mainstream cultural views of their time, while introverts tend to reject mainstream values in favor of their own individualistic choices. But Myers discovered that a typical ISTJ is significantly more likely to be a traditionalist than a typical (more independent-minded) ENTP. Jung said an extravert likes change and "discovers himself in the fluctuating and changeable," while an introvert resists change and identifies with the "changeless and eternal." But Myers discovered that it was the S/N and J/P dimensions that primarily influenced someone's attitude toward change, rather than whether they were introverted or extraverted.

And so on. The appropriate way to view the Myers-Briggs typology is not as some kind of simplified (and more "testable") implementation of Jung's original typology. Instead, it's fairer to say that the Myers-Briggs typology is basically where Jung's typology ended up after it was very substantially modified — not to mention expanded — to fit the evidence.

As another example, and as discussed at length in this post, most modern Si descriptions — including the ones you'll find in more function-centric sources like Thomson, Berens, Nardi and Quenk — bear little resemblance to Jung's Si descriptions, and are more like the opposite of Jung's descriptions in many respects. Virtually nobody respectable really subscribes to Jung's original conception of Si anymore, and I think it's fair to say that Jung's Si-dom description does a poor job of capturing the personality of any reasonably large group of non-disordered people who have ever walked the Earth, today or in 1921 or at any time. And in any case, it certainly does a lousy job of describing most of the people (extraverts and introverts both) whose preferences put them on the S and J sides of those two MBTI dimensions.

So it speaks well for you if you're finding yourself with "quite a few doubts." There's nothing wrong with reading Psychological Types if you're interested, and I've read it more than once myself. But you should realize that, although Jung had a lot of insightful things to say about various two-kinds-of-people-in-the-world characteristics that have proven to be psychometrically respectable and have been incorporated into the MBTI, there's a lot that Jung got wrong, too.

- I've yet to find it clearly stated that the auxiliary function's orientation counters that of the dominant function (though that is stated about the inferior function), where, if at all is this stated in his work?
Jung's function stack for a Ti-dom with an N-aux (for example) was Ti-Ni-Se-Fe — and if you're interested, you'll find a long discussion of that in this post.
 
#13 ·
And so on. The appropriate way to view the Myers-Briggs typology is not as some kind of simplified (and more "testable") implementation of Jung's original typology. Instead, it's fairer to say that the Myers-Briggs typology is basically where Jung's typology ended up after it was very substantially modified — not to mention expanded — to fit the evidence.
I would like to add that socionics became an extension of Jungian stuff. Actually it's a huge pile of people thoughts unified into one thing. Often people into it call it science of psychology and sociology. Just food for thought.

In socionics one interesting thing is that Jung's thoughts were glued together with Dabrowski's and it works out really well.

I know that this is becoming off-topic, but I would like to mention where Lenore is. I don't think that she really extended anything much or offered something good. I think of her stuff as shoddy version of Jung or Myers.
 
#3 ·
@reckful
Thank you, a lot of this I'll have to get back to once I have a decent screen and keyboard in front of me. I'd gotten the impression that an intuitive Ti Dom's stack would be Ti Ne Se Fe according to Jung, that correction was in order. I'll be reading through your other posts in due time. If I may ask, what then was Jung's structural distinction between two functions that dealt with abstraction, say Ni and Ne? His subject-object dichotomies seem quite murky to me in this set of writings...

PS: I have no way of sending you a PM as my post count does not allow it, but I'd very much like to enquire as to how you'd type me in Jungian terms, should this be of any interest to you, if so personalitycafe.com/whats-my-personality-type/1278061-type-me-aid-me-self-typing.html (can't post the full link either).
Either way, I'll respond to the rest of the content you provided me with once I'm actually able to do so.
 
#4 · (Edited)
Introverted/extraverted are Jung's mislabeling for subjective/objective. The structure (independent/dependent) makes the functions different, not the content.

Feeling and thinking are Jung's mislabeling for logical and ethical rationale. By definition all functions must be mutually exclusive.

Jung misunderstood objective and subjective. The actual definitions, based on usage, are subjective~independent and objective~dependent. Hence the subjective (introverted) functions control the objective (extraverted) functions.

This model makes the assumption that all data is either sensation or the lack of sensation (intuition).

The auxiliary function must counter the dominant function's orientation because subjective functions must be paired with objective functions to function and perception functions must be paired with judgement functions to facilitate rationale.

I would advise learning about Socionics BEFORE trying to understand Jung because Augusta improved quite a bit on Jung. She made the system more logically constant and understanding her changes help see the mistakes Jung made. Else you will be confused by Jung's stream of consciousness writing and lack of attention to rational consistency.
 
#5 ·
@Toroidal As with the post above, I can't respond in-depth at the moment...
I see, but Jung repeatedly stated that the functions (a section on introverted vs extroverted thinking I'm particular comes to mind) have the same structure (at least this is stated for the logic and procedure of thinking)... What am I missing here? When does the structural difference arise, if it doesn't come at the hand of its domain of concern?
So it truly is a logic vs ethics dichotomy? That seems awfully reductive... What I gathered was that thinking and feeling were mutually exclusive in the data and procedures they employed (which would result in irreconcilable differences, and contact with different aspects of reality), but not necessarily in the matters with which they were concerned (he wrote a little on the ethics of the extroverted thinking type, the way in which the function would serve such a matter)... Was I mistaken in this interpretation?
 
#6 ·
I don't advise taking Jung's interpretation as scripture. Jung even states that in the last paragraph of psychological typology (1936). He calls his work "an explanatory basis."

Logic and Ethic are mutually exclusive in terms of data. Logic is attempting to determine whether something is true/false while ethic is attempting to determine whether something is good/bad. With regards to matters, it depends. Certain situations will require making both a logical and ethical judgement while other situations will only require one. With regards to procedure, it depends on whether the functions are Subjective/Objective. Subjective Logic/Ethic are both Deductive while Objective Logic/Ethic are both Inductive.
 
#7 · (Edited)
@Toroidal
I don't intend to treat them as scripture, I'm merely hoping to solidify my understanding of the original texts. I'll be looking into socionics, thank you for the suggestion.
I really can't get into it in anything approaching the appropriate length for the topic at hand, but I would contest the notion that ethics and logic are mutually exclusive, structurally they both presuppose the existence of value, at least functionally (even things such as logical consistency require a form of value; one cannot reason to the advantage or necessity of logical consistency before having assumed it already, without circular reasoning, it is bedrock), etc... And it isn't clear to me that logic is merely a matter of bivalent truth claims, and it isn't clear to me, for instance, that the data by which a claim's veracity can be be judged is that data that it intends to represent - I would say that there are respectably consistent epistemologies that don't deal with truth in this way. Judgements of value and desirability are built into the ways in which we ponder the truth value of a given thing, and ethical systems either presuppose, require, or mainly consist of logical operation. Take a concrete example, take defining health without operationalizing the definition of "optimal state", something with requires valuation of some sort... This to say that part of my confusion stems from not knowing where the line is being drawn between these two, heavily interlinked notions...
I hope that was at least somewhat cogent, I can't actually proofread or elaborate further at the moment.
As for the distinction between inductive and deductive... Interesting, would a "subjective" function not be able to reason in a fundamentally different way (and so to for an extroverted function)? Would they be bound in that manner? Individual' certainly can, so at what level would the variation in reasoning be injected, if one presumes that all judgement relies upon the functions?
 
#8 · (Edited)
You need to define your terms.

I define logic as decision making (judgement) based on non-living things and ethic as decision making (judgement) based on living things. I claim that logic and ethic are mutually exclusive by definition. (FYI this is deductive reasoning).

I define subjective as the subject and objective as the object. Therefore subjective is independent while objective is dependent. Thus subjective and objective refer to the psychologic functions relationship to each other, not in relation to the outside world. This is different from Jung who tried to define both functions in terms relationship to the outside world. Note: These definitions are consistant with Grammar/English 101 but they are reverse of Kant's usage of the terms.

Value depends on the judgement function. In logical reasoning value might be increasing users or profit. While in ethical reasoning value might be increasing customer satisfaction. Both judgement functions deal with value but value is different in each function.

I hope that was at least somewhat cogent
Nope, I couldn't understand anything you said but it seemed to be an argument between inductive and deductive reasoning.

Interesting, would a "subjective" function not be able to reason in a fundamentally different way (and so to for an extroverted function)?
I should give you the full definition.

Deduction: Subjective (Introverted) Judgement & Objective (Extraverted) Perception
Induction: Subjective (Introverted) Perception & Objective (Extraverted) Judgement

Reasoning only occurs when a subjective judgement function interacts with an objective perception function, or vice-versa. A function by itself cannot reason. A perception function cannot do the judgement process and a judgement function lacks the information to make a decision on. Thus reasoning requires both subjective and objective components.

Individual' certainly can, so at what level would the variation in reasoning be injected
The psyche is made up of 2 deduction and 2 induction blocks. Model A calls this the ego, super-ego, super-id, and id blocks.

if one presumes that all judgement relies upon the functions?
correct
 
#9 ·
@Toroidal
Ah, well, let's see if this makes a little more sense... What I was trying to convey was merely that there are epistemological definitions of truth that don't depend on representational accuracy, meaning that the truth value isn't given by what a certain proposition is attempting to represent/state (think Davidson's definition of truth, for instance); these are definitions of truth that require concordance with a supposed objective reality, but not correspondence, so a statement is useful, true, but it isn't true by virtue of what we'd consider its content (so no linguistic item is said to correspond with no non-linear item, in the same way that a tool isn't said to represent or correspond to what it can manipulate).
I consider logic to be the pattern/standard of valid inference, the standard of internal (and ultimately external) consistency that allows for a given model to be interoperable (and is foundational for structuring truth claims, and they space in which they exist). I consider ethics to be the set of subdomains (of problems, statements, etc) that have implications for conscious creatures (therefore, for value, therefore, for action).
I define subjective as the internal domain of experience (or at minimum, a domain in which there is still a point of view, where a complete bird's eye view is impossible), and objective as the hypothetical third-person domain outside of (though always interacting with) experience.
As for the necessity of both subjective and objective functions for both perception and judgement, makes perfect sense, I mostly asking whether the nature of the judgement varied according to orientation.
Again, hope that made sense, can't actually proof read properly
 
#10 · (Edited)
meaning that the truth value isn't given by what a certain proposition is attempting to represent/state; these are definitions of truth that require concordance with a supposed objective reality
This is called induction; you sample particular data then make a generalized judgement.

I consider logic to be the pattern/standard of valid inference, the standard of internal (and ultimately external) consistency that allows for a given model to be interoperable (and is foundational for structuring truth claims, and they space in which they exist).
This definition is too vague and convoluted. It's not usable.
If anything, this definition is more true of reason/rationality/judgement in general rather than logic specifically.

I consider ethics to be the set of subdomains (of problems, statements, etc) that have implications for conscious creatures (therefore, for value, therefore, for action).
The problem with making ethic a subset of logic is it necessitates all ethical decisions to have logical components. e.g. You would have to funnel virtues and vices through numbers. This doesn't make any sense. In reality you'll see this where logic wants to optimize efficiency of a system (numbers) while ethic wants to optimize happiness (values).

In terms of Jung's model, it would completely destroy the types because every ethical (feeling) type would be a subtype of a logical (thinking) type.

I define subjective as the internal domain of experience (or at minimum, a domain in which there is still a point of view, where a complete bird's eye view is impossible), and objective as the hypothetical third-person domain outside of (though always interacting with) experience.
1) The technical definition is opposite. Your view is a modern misinterpretation of subjective/objective. Older words or phrases still preserve the correct interpretation. Subjective is independent of your frame of reference, e.g. The king's subjects. People are subjects from the King's perspective, i.e. subjectively true, because their existence does not depend on the king viewing them.

2) The problem with this definition is it doesn't help explain the functions relationship amongst themselves. How does a subjective function interact with an objective function? Likewise what is subjective data vs. objective data? Ironically Jung discribes this as a major problem in his work but choose to ignore the issue.

As for the necessity of both subjective and objective functions for both perception and judgement, makes perfect sense, I mostly asking whether the nature of the judgement varied according to orientation.
Again, hope that made sense, can't actually proof read properly
What do you mean by orientation?
 
#11 · (Edited)
@Toroidal Thank you for taking the time to contend with my questions.
The statement I made about the nature of truth, and theories of it didn't pertain (or didn't only pertain) to inductive reasoning, it was about what is meant by concordance based truth vs correspondence based truth (the thesis I presented, which isn't my own, essentially makes no distinction between kinds of knowledge (physics vs literary criticism, for instance), only kinds of utility as conceived of by humans, even if at many levels). I don't actually subscribe to this view at all, I was merely expanding on my initial point of confusion, just what the terminalogy signified for Jung.
I'm not sure we disagree on the nature of logic, I'm practically stating that it is the set of rules governing inference as well as the validity of a given statement (internally or otherwise), I'm not sure that this is a particularly convoluted way of putting it, but point taken, I'll have to revisit this once I'm not as sleep deprived.
I wasn't making ethics a subset of logic, I was making ethics the subset of things that have any kind of implication for conscious creatures. All I stated was that ethics too conforms to patterns of valid inference, in so far as its formal, the (ethical) system is undergirded by "logical" constraints. I was not proposing that qualitative domains are a subset of quantitative domains.
I was actually not even really attempting to present a view, I was trying to bring just these inconstancies to light, so as to have jung-compatible working definitions. Perhaps it is a modern misunderstanding, I was referring to the fact that value stems from the fact of experience, and calling the domain in which value and qualitative distinctions (among other things) of this sort exist, subjective. In your example, the subjects' existence as subjects is contingent upon their relationship to the king, so again, I'm not sure that we're disagreeing. I see how it makes more sense to on Jungian terms, to refer to that which is not primarily reliant on the object independent.
I agree that my definition does provide an explanatory basis for interactions between the functions, it's not even my definition, it's my attempt to fine-tune the concept and clear my thinking.
By orientation I meant object vs subject.
Again, can't proofread, short on time.
 
#12 · (Edited)
The statement I made about the nature of truth, and theories of it didn't pertain (or didn't only pertain) to inductive reasoning, it was about what is meant by concordance based truth vs correspondence based truth (the thesis I presented
What you are calling "concordance based truth" is called deductive reasoning and "correspondence based truth" is called inductive reasoning. These are the standard terms for the 2 different types of reasoning processes.

I'm not sure we disagree on the nature of logic, I'm practically stating that it is the set of rules governing inference as well as the validity of a given statement (internally or otherwise), I'm not sure that this is a particularly convoluted way of putting it, but point taken, I'll have to revisit this once I'm not as sleep deprived.
I wasn't making ethics a subset of logic, I was making ethics the subset of things that have any kind of implication for conscious creatures. All I stated was that ethics too conforms to patterns of valid inference, in so far as its formal, the (ethical) system is undergirded by "logical" constraints. I was not proposing that qualitative domains are a subset of quantitative domains.
Again, the mistake you are making is not clearly defining your terms. What you call "logic" is actually the broader category of reason or knowledge, rationality or judgement as Jung called it. A more simple or elegant definition for reasoning is judgement or decision-making. Logic and ethic are both disciplines under reason. They are two different methods to make a decision.
 
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