This is a discussion on It's not about the nail... within the ENTJ Forum - The Executives forums, part of the NT's Temperament Forum- The Intellects category; Originally Posted by bionic I really wanna know what happens if I take a hammer to that nail..... with sufficient ...
honestly depending on the person I'll just wait with my hammer and tongs/pliers.
After all it's only brain surgery, it's not rocket science.
Something that came to mind recently that reminded me of this video was that while we sympathize with the guy whose pointing out the problem. One can interpret it not as merely a failure of the woman with the nail in her head but a failure of him to actually cultivate that perspective in her.
This sentiment I have found shared within counselling and teaching, where you're meant to figure out how to get the person to engage with the thing themselves which doesn't work if you're just explicitly directing them.
Paper for JinanThough the above is in the context of some truth outside the bounds of language, I think it does touch on the interaction that one nurtures in someone else. This would even apply to the debates we see on here, one can't make someone accept certain facts until you get them to traverse certain perspectives in order to see them in a certain light.Teaching with an Empty Bucket
According to one well-known model of teaching, the teacher has a big bucket of water from which the students will try to gather a few drops to put into their empty buckets. It's nothing new to say that this model creates dependency and cheap imitation, and not the independence of thought needed to change the world and resist tyranny – which I think are needed today. In both the West and the East, this view has long ago been challenged by a variety of teaching models that focus on the development of latent potential in the student and the role of the teacher as facilitator in bringing the student to the position where she can activate that potential.
There is a long tradition of such teaching in both East and West. The Socratic teaching depicted by Plato is usually characterized by the teacher's use of dialogue to draw the student into making his own conclusions based on his own internal reasoning process. One might think that this reasoning process is social, not individual, if it weren't for the importance given to the role of Socrates' little demon (daimonion) or voice, which invokes a non-social aspect. Again, with the view of education found in Plato's allegory of the cave in the Republic there is something structurally similar to the teachings of Chan Buddhism – the world we normally live in, the one the cave-dwellers see flickering on the wall of the cave, is an illusion and education consists in liberation from that illusion in the "turning of the soul."
If we fast-forward some 2300 years, to Friedrich Nietzsche, we again find the Socratic motif, this time as liberation from the dominant herd-oriented thought: "Your teacher can only be your liberator. And that is the secret of all education: it doesn't offer artificial limbs, wax noses, bespectacled eyes – rather, what these borrowings can give is only the false effigy of education." Again, education comes from inside, and not from outside. And the liberation is not only psychological, but also involves a changed view of reality itself. But here as well, no view is offered as to how teacher plays the role of facilitator. That view comes up, I believe, only when education is seen in terms of liberation from the illusion of an errant discourse and, thus, the teacher's role is seen as an intersubjective symbolic intervention into the student's errant discourse, enabling the student to break from the illusion and achieve the satori of Zen Buddhism or psychoanalytic cure.
And getting someone to change perspective so that they can 'see' isn't something that can necessarily be done quickly, but in terms of efficiency, the fastest thing would be based on what works and if the above doesn't work than it's not efficient.
To which sometimes being direct certainly does work, but it's clearly not the be all end all route. And that which really changes the person's perspective would be more enduring and stable.
In regards to counselling, say someone has some sort of issue where they're paranoid their partner is cheating on them and they're not. Because the problem isn't about proving that their partner is or isn't cheating, because the issue doesn't stem from reality itself.
To help explain, Lacan apparently has a good example in which he details why someone's paranoia about their wife cheating may still be pathological regardless of whether it's true or not.
Similar notion is explained by Zizek in regards to racists/fascists where the question is about the truth of their belief but going behind the truth/falsity in order to ask why do they want it to be true. What is the perceived truth meant to be affirming (often a larger belief about the inherent threat of something like Jews or blacks).If we formulate the example of jealousy in terms of the common reading of the formula of fetishism, we get the following statement: 'I know my wife's not cheating on me, but all the same I believe she is cheating on me.' Here, the pathological character of jealousy amounts to the opposition between knowledge and belief: the husband's suspicion is pathological because it opposes his knowledge, and as soon as it proves to be founded, as soon as this external opposition between knowledge and belief is dismissed (in favour of knowledge), the pathological dimension of his jealousy vanishes, too.
Lacan's formula is founded on a more radical concept of the pathological, on a radical notion of mystification as an inherent characteristic of jealousy, which as such remains pathological despite better knowledge. The formula given above entials two key operations. The twofold operation consists of the 'repression' of the belief and the formation of a substitute; that is, rationalisation (Zizek, 1991, p. 242), assuming, say, the following (chauvinistic) form: 'I know she's not cheating on me, but a statistical fact remains that women are cheater not to be trusted.'
Let us oppose this example the formula that doesn't require 'external' negation: 'I know she is cheating on me, but all the same I believe she is cheating on me.' IN the first case the belief ('That she's cheating on me') is 'repressed' because it pragmatically contradicts better knowledge ('that she's not cheating on me'); that is because, it negates the very content of knowledge. In the second case, this ground for 'repression' falls away, since belief in this case neither contradicts knowledge nor negates its content. But the 'repression' nonetheless remains in place and so does jealousy's pathological character. The gist of this pathological nature of jealousy can be formulate as follows: 'You know you are being cheated on, so why are you still jealous? Why do you still believe she's cheating on you when in fact you know well she's cheating on you? Why are you rationalising?
Imagine a husband who suspects that his wife is unfaithful and hires a detective who confirms his suspicion. Yet the husband doesn't want to act upon his knowledge; he refuses to draw the consequences and decides to keep on living the old way. It would be too simple to claim that he doesn't want to know and that he would much rather sacrifice his knowledge (of her unfaithfulness) in favour of his belief (in her faithfulness), sticking to the lie and 'repressing the truth. Such a reading misses the fact that he believed in her unfaithfulness, not faithfulness, and that his decision to stay with her is not a decision to believe in her faithfulness despite better knowledge. The situation is more complex: despite his knowledge of her unfaithfulness, he keeps on believing in her unfaithfulness. His knowledge is not disavowed by a naive illusionof her faithfullness; he disavoids it in an 'enlightened' way by continuing to believ ein her unfaithfulness, which enables him to stick to his (mere) suspciion. The fetishist disavowal thus negates without engating the predicate - knowledge is disavowed not by way of not believing, by not wanting to believe, but, more radically, by believing in it, by wanting to believe. THe husband is deceiving himself by way of the truth. He knows he is being cheated on, but, he continues to act as if he believed he is being cheated on (by, say, performing the usual rituals of suspicion and yielding to excessive outbursts of jealousy). This surplus of belief at work in materiality of his actions, this 'too-muchness' of knowledge, forms the element that engages his enjoyment and effeectively makes his jealousy pathological.
The key element of my formula of 'fetishism without the fetish' thus concerns a contradiction, reduced, in this reading, to its degree zero. The subtraction of the 'external' negation between my knowledge that x and my simultaneous belief that non-x doesn't substract from the contradiction as such but, on the contrary, presents it in its minimal and purely formal state, as a pure gap, a formal surplus of knowledge, which has no content but stands for a pure self-distance of knowledge, for its inherently inconsistent character.
The Subject Supposed to Loot and Rape - In These TimesAnd exactly the same goes for the looting in New Orleans: Even if all the reports on violence and rapes had proven to be factually true, the stories circulating about them would still be “pathological” and racist, since what motivated these stories were not facts, but racist prejudices, the satisfaction felt by those who would be able to say: “You see, Blacks really are like that, violent barbarians under the thin layer of civilization!” In other words, we would be dealing with what could be called lying in the guise of truth: Even if what I am saying is factually true, the motives that make me say it are false.
This point from above enters into a complicated matter about our theory of truth, which most commonly is a correspondence theory of truth which treats the subject as a mirror of reality and neglect subjectivity.
Thinking and Being: Lacan versus Parmenides | Philosophical Explorations
The correspondence theory utilizes a mirror model between subject and world; the removal of the mirror leaves us in the dark concerning the real.
The second reason for Lacan’s rejection of the adequation theory is the elimination of the subjective dimension of truth. It assumes that the knowing subject is self-transparent. What is the difference between a proposition “p” and “p is true”? Against deflationary theories of truth, which claim that there is no difference, one can argue that the second proposition, “p is true” is a proposition about a proposition: it adds not more content, but another dimension. This dimension is no longer independent from the subject. Whereas traditional theories of truth only consider the polar opposites true/false, Lacan considers the opposition truth/lie. The reason for his emphasis on the “I am lying” example is exactly this: If one only thinks of the relationship between concept and reality for the question of truth, as the adequation theory does, then one has already foreclosed the dimension where the question of truth gains its relevance for us: the human dimension. Subsequently, on the level of concept/reality alone, the “I am lying” becomes a paradox, because “I” can only be understood as an entity that thinks: being has ontological priority. (This is the shadow of Parmenides.) The contradiction dissolves if one separates “I” from being; the separation shifts the dimension of truth from concept/reality to subject/Other (understood as the locus of the signifier) or to the relationship subject/language. In order to gain such a two-dimensional view of the concept of “truth” one has to accept the priority of the signifier in relation to the signified as a well as in relation to the subject.
Representatives of the adequatio theory realized that although truth is always truth for somebody, it cannot be subjective. They argue that the subject has to be excluded from the definition of truth because we live in a common reality (the facts of the world are the same for all of us). The exclusion of the subject is done with the assumption that the mind – as mirror – is self-transparent and that the subject in its particularity can be separated from the epistemic process. Because human consciousness can be self-referential it is easy to assume that the “I” is identical with itself; the next step is the subtraction of the subject from the equation of truth, even if it is the subject that enunciates the truth-statement. For Lacan, then, the correspondence theory hides the deeper split between the subject and the real as well as the split within the subject itself. What remains is the construction of a common reality.
For every speaking being, the cause of its desire is, in terms of structure, strictly equivalent, so to speak, to its bending, that is, to what I have called its division as subject. That is what explains why the subject could believe for so long that the world knew as much about things as he did. The world is symmetrical to the subject — the world of what I last time called thought is the equivalent, the mirror image, of thought. That is why there was noth*ing but fantasy regarding knowledge until the advent of the most modern science.” 26
It's a difficult task to manipulate that which isn't about facts themselves but how one interprets and constructs what is to be considered fact. Which is why a counselor doesn't just lay it on the table what's clearly the problem, but tries to get the client to connect the dots for themselves, to see the relationship between things.
And sometimes the problem isn't even a lack of insight, but something else, because awareness doesn't break the spell.
Å½iÅ¾ek, Slavoj | Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyAnd this is why knowledge doesn't emancipate a person and make them see the light, as facts don't necessarily challenge the perception. Subjectivity and how we relate to the real world which is often mediated by symbolic relationships complicates things.Again bringing the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan to bear in political theory, ˇi˛ek argues that the attitude of subjects towards authority revealed by today’s ideological cynicism resembles the fetishist’s attitude towards his fetish. The fetishist’s attitude towards his fetish has the peculiar form of a disavowal: “I know well that (for example) the shoe is only a shoe, but nevertheless, I still need my partner to wear the shoe in order to enjoy.” According to ˇi˛ek, the attitude of political subjects towards political authority evinces the same logical form: “I know well that (for example) Bob Hawke / Bill Clinton / the Party / the market does not always act justly, but I still act as though I did not know that this is the case.”
Which is why I wanted to pontificate a different view that turned it the other way around where the silliness is put back onto him.
Which was partly me taking myself down a peg as I can get stuck in that same mindset where my thought is what's the solution to this, because if I solve this then the emotional stuff will be resolved. But this has often gotten me into more strife than necessary and I think rather than feel that such a position is necessarily right, good to empathize with the other person as to why it's not helpful. Especially when the person already intellectually understands the solutions or able to figure that out. Showing that the problem isn't an inability to problem solve in that regard.
That in the end, the real dummy is the person who is resistant to adapting to the needs of the situation and frustrates themselves and the other because of it.
Now I agree, how you relay a message is important to calming down someone. If my goal is to help deal with the problem someone faces, then it falls on my responsibility to achieve that goal. Therefore, if I fail, I take blame in not fixing the situation successfully. Despite me not liking it, dealing with someone's emotions would be a part of that process, so it would be ignorant of me to just blame someone for being emotionally stubborn. It's my duty to swerve around that. Even if I'm inexperienced or innocent, it's still failure. It's like when you're managing a group, is it their fault for poor performance or is it your fault for poor communication? Now does that mean I have to provide complete emotional comfort toward the person in order to assert my logic? No. It's a matter of accommodation to the nuances of the person you're working with because everyone and the issues they face are different, so whatever works is what works is my reply.
So is the guy the "real dummy?" In my opinion, it's failed thinking on both ends. The girl is clearly emotionally bitter, which affects her judgement. The guy is unable to look beyond the nail to find a solution to the issue, and therefore, cannot fix the issue without releasing the ire of his spouse.
Me and my intj found that the very best way to deal with emotions is to vocalize them. Because then they can become logical. We're so out of touch with emotion that are lost and get upset at our selves and each other for things going on because there is no logic or reasoning. Once we manage to vocalize some sub surface issue regardless of what they are or how major they are. We feel better and okay.
However things don't get better until they are fully entirely vocalized and surfaced.
Entj tip of the day. To an extent actually stay in touch with your emotions