The common thing to all cultural values is that they're about an idea of what a good life for human beings is.
https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses...m-nihilism.pdfIt is from a way of life that we can determine what is good which changes as predicaments emerge in the organization of that means of life.When we look at the moral views of various cultures, MacIntyre says, one thing we do not find is the view that these views are only binding on members of the relevant culture. Rather, the moral views of cultures are typically views about how it is best for human beings in general to live, and not just members of that culture.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablu...d%20Utopia.pdfWhich is why in the modern world, the sort of ethics that is common is actually a morally reductive approach based in utilitarian ethics where what is good is not on any common good, but only satisfaction of individual desires. The way of modern life gives rise to such an ethic and emerged as it was objectified by the emerging ruling capitalist class.Participants in a practice are striving for some good which is intrinsic to that practice; they may be motivated to do so by external goods. The distinction between goods internal to a practice and goods external to the practice is crucial. The successful solution of a difficult problem in medical science is an example of an internal good, and the scientist achieving it will feel good about it, whilst winning the Nobel Prize is an external good. In both cases, the participant may experience pleasure, but only in the case of the internal good does the community as a whole receive a benefit. Practices arise in response to some problem (or opportunity) with the formation of a concept of the problematic situation, the realization of which is the end at which the practice aims. This concept undergoes development as people learn from the experience of trying to realize it. The enjoyment (and fame) arising from the successful practice of medicine, (which is the well-being of patients), for example, is not the end at which medicine aims. Rather this enjoyment supervenes upon the successful activity (1981, p. 184), that is, it is a by-product of pursuing the good of the practice. The good at which the practice is directed is definitive of the practice even though both the practice and its aim change over time, the practice maintains a narrative unity as it undergoes historical development and both its ends and its means change.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablu...macintyre2.pdfTo the extent people's moral sense is the dominant liberal one as opposed to the values of a particular community (religious, sociopolitical, etc), they tend to affirm this highly abstract reduction of things to their utility in realizing immediate pleasure.Thus, the social bases of liberalism are two-fold: the raising of property to the status of the primary social relation, and the loss of community, the loss of the capacity to appeal to or rely upon shared meaning beyond the satisfaction of individual desire.
In each of the historical settings that MacIntyre investigates, he is able to show that the type of justice and the type of rationality which appears to the philosophical spokespeople of the community to be necessary and universal, turns out to be a description of the type of citizens of the community in question. Accordingly, the justice of liberalism and the rationality of liberalism is simply that justice and that rationality of the “citizens of nowhere” (p. 388), the “outsiders,” people lacking in any social obligation or any reason for acting other than to satisfy their desires and to defend the conditions under which they are able to continue satisfying their desires. Their rationality is therefore that of the objects of their desire.
But because not everyone is an ardent liberal, there are competing notions of what is good such that instead of a focus on what constitutes good behaviour we can ask what constitutes a good person. Because such a question isn't posed by utilitarianism, as it isn't concerned with character or the person at all except the result of their actions in realizing some overall pleasure/satisfaction.
Money controls the limits of survival in modern life but need not be swallowed whole as being acceptable by people.
We can challenge such a conception of ethicsAlthough because the way our means of living is organized we do have to live by such ethical principles as it is actively developed as a way of life with the expansion of capital.MacIntyre shows convincingly that neither position can be sustained in respect to the traditions of enquiry described in his book. All traditions of life and therefore of philosophy have standards by which they are able to judge the adequacy of their own account; under the impact of criticism from outside or by the disclosure of new problems from within, all traditions of enquiry, all communities, are continually changing, frequently finding that former beliefs have become obsolete and sometimes undergoing ‘epistemological crisis’, perhaps merging with other currents or collapsing. While no tradition can exclude the possibility that its current beliefs and practices may become outmoded, within its own terms; conversely, all traditions have the capacity to subject others to criticism and frequently such criticisms succeed and rival traditions change under the impact of such challenges.\
More generally, liberalism may be the dominant ethic today, but it is by no means excluded that other traditions which are able to bring to bear on liberalism a history of practical critique, cannot be sustained and, given the inherent vulnerability of liberalism, successfully challenge its dominance
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablu...lourishing.pdfAs each culture makes absolute it's own values for the way human beings should live and what they should value and should protect as a way of life, we can meaningfully engage rival traditions by criticism of how they fail by their own standards or are inadequate in some way when advocating a new way of living.When Economics builds its science on the assumption of an independent, individual economic agent who makes decisions to maximise their own utility they take as given a society in which the norms of Utilitarianism are universal. In the event that the subjects of a community do not act as individuals maximising their own utility, then the science fails. But perhaps more importantly, governments and firms which make policy on the basis of economic science, and therefore Utilitarian ethics, are acting so as to foster this ethos in the community, with all the consequences in terms of inequality and social disintegration.
Such is the nature of ethical politics that new ways of life are advocated.And the only way we can assert an ethical claim when modern life is so fragmented into individualistic desires is to be part of some shared way of life which impacts ones self and others and make ethical appeals to them within that project as moral equals.Ethical politics is the political terrain in which the right way to live is subject to contest, but there is not necessarily any contest for state power or any attempt to seek office or build organisations.
Ethical politics was first developed in recent times in the Womens Movement and the Green Movement: people who supported the movement exercised their politics by acting according to certain ethical principles, such as re-cycling their own rubbish, or not wearing make-up or whatever, rather than by being members of an organisation, participating in political actions or attempting to remove people from positions of authority.
Ethical politics contrasts with identity politics in that it rejects relativism and insists upon the validity of standards against which ethical behaviour can be measured – that is: “it is not just my choice to recycle rubbish, you should as well.” Ethical politics arises out of alliance politics as groups with different theories and different priorities seek unifying principles and ways of expressing their common aims.
Ethical politics differs from fundamentalism because its aim is to develop principles and imperatives which express new ways of acting and emerging social relations, whereas fundamantalism promotes outmoded ethical principles from the past in order to “turn back the clock” and re-establish old ways of living.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablu...t-position.htmSo we end up with two universal imperatives:
(1) Participants in a project decide amongst themselves what they will do. (Participation is decided by opting in opting out, and participation includes conflict and opposition.)
(2) It is wrong to conduct any project in secrecy from anyone who could be affected, or without reasonable measures to give anyone who could be affected the ability to make relevant judgments about the project.
Moral discourse which is based around events, dilemmas or relationships in which the participants in the discourse are not participants in a relevant common project, is meaningless. What should the French government do about the hijab? What position should a socialist take in Iraq today? How can there be sensible answers to these questions for someone who is not French or not in Iraq?
The above ethical obligations arise solely from the dictum: “What we do is decided by us.”